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SYNOPSIS OF PART 1: In Part 1, I suggested that the film Babe  
provided a valuable context in which to discuss the replacement of the 
Cartesian mechanistic model of animals, which has dominated the 
industrial world since the Enlightenment, by a communicative model 
which is more suited to survival in an ecological age. The film offers a 
recognition of communicative virtues and characteristics as central to 
both human and nonhuman forms of life, and a vision of the emergence 
of communicative forms of relationship as victorious alternatives to 
forms based on violence, domination and terror.  Focussing on the 
paradox of the speaking meat the leading character Babe represents, I 
argued that one of the great strengths of the film is that it invites us to 
challenge some of the blocks and erasures which support our denial of 
the meat animal as a communicative subject.  As Babe's drama of 
recognition reveals the multiple insensitivities and denials of kinship that 
are part of the meaning of meat in our society, we can grasp the 
possibility of alternative meanings that recognise food as kin.  I outlined 
a context-sensitive approach to vegetarianism which refuses cultural 
universalism and recognises the radically different ethical meanings meat 
can have in different societies.  Finally I explored some of the ethical and 
political ambiguities of communicative forms, and the tantalising 
questions Babe  raises about the communicative farm.  Will the new 
communicative paradigm be used to liberate the sheep and the other farm 
animals, or merely to oppress them in more subtle and self-complicit 
ways?  Will the communicative animal farm stand to the mechanistic 
farm as the hegemonic communicative forms of liberal democracy stand 
to the more repressive forms of patriarchal-authoritarian governance they 
replaced?    
 
NOW READ ON to discover in PART 11 the moral ambiguities of the 
human-animal contract, the conceptual traps of pet/meat and person 




4: Communication and Anthropomorphism  
Babe's opening shot shows Babe waking in communicative interaction 
with siblings, expressing sorrow at the loss of his mother and fear as he 
is seized and carried away.  These are all emotions we can realistically 
expect real pigs to feel and express in this situation, and Babe's 'human' 
speech as it emerges in this context seems a natural expression of these 
emotions, wishes and beliefs. The animal communication introduced here 
works well because it continues and extends the normal body language 
and communication of the animals.  Nevertheless, the representation of 
such animal subjectivity in human terms is often said to be irresolutely 
problematic and invalidly 'anthropomorphic'.  It is worth considering and 
clarifying this charge in relation to the representation of animal 
communication and subjectivity in works of art.  I will argue that there is 
no good basis for the general claim that an artwork is invalidated by 
anthropomorphism merely on the ground that it attributes subjectivity 
and communication to nonhumans. The problems in representing other 
species' communicative powers or subjectivities in terms of human 
speech are real, but they do not rule out such representation in any 
general way, and they pale before the difficulties of failing to represent 
them at all, or before the enormity of representing communicative and 
intentional beings as beings lacking all communicative and mental 
capacity.  That is a much greater inaccuracy and injustice than any 
anthropomorphism could be. 
 
We need to distinguish various senses of anthropomorphism, including 
general and specific senses.  The general concept and charge of 
anthropomorphism, as Mary Midgley1 has argued, is in its usual sense 
and definition thoroughly confused.  It is ambiguous as between 
attributing to nonhumans characteristics humans have (OED), and 
attributing to nonhumans characteristics only humans have.  Both senses 
are problematic, in slightly different ways, when used to support the 
claim that the attribution of characteristics such as subjectivity to animals 
must be anthropomorphic.  The first sense, that something is 
anthropomorphic if it attributes to animals characteristics humans have, 
implies that there is no overlap of characteristics between humans and 
nonhuman animals.  That is, it assumes a hyperseparation of human and 
animal natures and attempts to enforce upon legitimate representations of 
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nonhumans such a radical discontinuity.  This sense should clearly be 
rejected, not only because it is based on a demonstrably false assumption 
of radical discontinuity, but because it can be used to delegitimate 
virtually any depiction of nonhuman subjectivity that made sense to us.  
 
The second sense of anthropomorphism - attributing to nonhumans 
characteristics only humans have - is not open to this objection, but is 
open to the objection that its use to delegitimate the attribution of 
subjectivity and other contested characteristics to nonhumans is simply 
question-begging.  It assumes just what is at issue, what opponents of the 
mechanistic model contest, that nonhumans do not have characteristics 
such as subjectivity and intentionality humans also possess.  As Midgley 
notes, the focus of this sense of the concept tends to be otiose and 
human-centred.  If something is to be faulted for attributing to 
nonhumans characteristics they do not have, it is sufficient to point out 
that this is an inaccurate way of representing them, and the inaccuracy 
itself provides (in a suitably veridical context) sufficient independent 
ground for rejecting such an attribution.  Unless there is a good reason 
for addressing the question of similarity to humans, it is simply 
anthrocentric to go on to bring every source of comparison and focus of 
assessment back to humans and to an animal's similarity or difference 
from them, as the concept of anthropomorphism tends to do.   
 
The critic of representing animals in communicative terms often draws 
on another sense of anthropomorphism which is closely analogous to the 
concept of weak anthrocentrism2, and which, like weak anthrocentrism,  
makes it very hard or impossible for representations of nonhumans to 
avoid being assigned the label anthropomorphism. This is a weak sense 
which locates anthropomorphism in the presentation of animal 
communication 'in human terms', from a human conceptual location. Any 
representation of the speech-content for a human audience will have to 
be an interpretation in terms of human concepts, and in that weak sense, 
a background level of anthropomorphism is always likely to be present. 
What is much more difficult to demonstrate is that anthropomorphism of 
this background kind, in the weak sense of employing a human 
conceptual apparatus or conceptual location, is necessarily harmful or 
invalidating, or that there are no practices which can counter it.   
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Where the charge of anthropomorphism can lead to the application of 
more stringent standards to the representation of animal communication 
than are used to judge the success of comparable human representation, it 
is itself liable to the counter-charge that it is anthrocentric. Arguments of 
this kind are often advanced to show that any representation of animal 
communication is rendered illegitimately anthropomorphic because of 
problems of translation and indeterminacy, although problems are also 
familiar in the representation of human cultural difference.  There are 
parallel difficulties for both cross-cultural and cross-species 
representation: a weak cross-cultural analogue to background 
anthropomorphism is involved in virtually any translation project, for 
example, in any attempt to 'bring over' one culture's forms into another's.  
To avoid delegitimating all such attempts, we need to distinguish the 
impact of weaker and stronger forms of anthropo- morphism, just as we 
need to distinguish weak and usually harmless forms of anthropocentrism 
from strong and damaging forms.3 Weak forms are unavoidable but not 
necessarily harmful, while strong forms may be damaging but are by no 
means inevitable. As with anthro- centrism, the confusion between the 
two forms gives rise to the illusion that damaging forms are inevitable.  
 
Once we proceed beyond these weak general senses, the concept of 
anthropomorphism is somewhat ill-defined, and the features being 
problematised under that description can usually be better characterised 
in terms of anthropocentrism rather than anthropomorphism.  But in the 
same way, the charge of anthropocentrism cannot be used in a 
generalised form to delegitimate representations of nonhumans as 
communicative subjects.  There may still sometimes be a point to the 
charge of strong anthropomorphism, but it becomes much harder to 
demonstrate.  As in the case of weak anthrocentrism, the question is not 
whether or not some degree of humanisation of perspective is present in 
any particular human representation of animal communication, for it 
always will be at the background level, but how damaging it is, what is 
its meaning, and what practices can be used to counter it?  Since the 
inevitable presence of background levels of anthromorphism means that 
the charge of impurity can always be raised, it is helpful here to 
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distinguish the motives for raising it.  Are there ever legitimate problems 
the charge points to? 
 
We have seen that a commonplace motivation for raising the charge of 
anthropomorphism is a rationalist-Cartesian policing of human-animal 
discontinuity, to maintain the human observer's distance from and  
indifference to the animal observed.  Although there is in response to the 
dominant Cartesian-rationalist stress on discontinuity often a need to 
provide a counterstress on continuity between the human and animal, the 
question of anthropomorphism can often be raised with some greater 
validity in the context of the denial of difference which is a key part of 
structures of subordination and colonisation to which animals are 
subject.4  The charge of anthropomorphism may then legitimately draw 
our attention to a loss of sensitivity to and respect for animal difference 
in humanisation or in representation.  The concern about lack of respect 
for difference can extend to cover even well-meaning animal rights 
attempts to assimilate animals within the model of the person, in contexts 
where there has been no associated attempt to deconstruct the 
person/property dualism formative of liberalism. 
 
But there are a host of dangers in this area uneasiness about 
anthropomorphism may reflect:  the infantilisation of animals which their 
insertion into the structures of the private household as pets or their 
treatment as adjuncts to human children tends to produce is just one of 
the forms of humanisation associated with the structuring of what 
domestic animals can become in terms of the limiting slots available for 
them in human society.  The charge of humanisation can draw attention 
to the reduction of the animal which appears in demeaning or 
subordinated forms of humanisation.  But some kinds of uneasiness 
about the influence of the human  are less warranted.  It is only too easy  
to adopt here over-strong criteria which unwittingly re-invest in  human-
animal dualism through the assumption that the only genuine animal is 
the wild animal, the animal completely apart from and uninfluenced by 
human society, (just as the only genuine indigene is one who looks and 
sounds exactly as before the days of contact). The genuine problem here 
is not so much human influence and relationship itself, which is not 
inevitably corrupting or demeaning, but the reduction of animals which 
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so often accompanies their insertion as subordinates, deviants or 
resources into an anthropocentric culture.  A solution does not have to try 
to maintain or represent an 'ideal' pure animal uninfluenced by 
interaction with the human - although every effort should be made to 
maintain wild animals in their own ecosystems - but to reach out for 
relationships that allow for both species together some kind of fullness of 
becoming, or, as Freya Mathews puts it, allows the animal to 'achieve a 
significant degree of the form of self-realisation appropriate to its 
particular kind'.5  The mixed farm of Babe showed some of the 
possibilities here, especially for the working dogs.   
 
A parallel set of issues arise in the case of representation.  As in the case 
of the human other, so in the animal, such representations must always 
raise questions about supplanting and assimilating the other.  However 
there can be no general argument that such cross-cultural perspectives 
presenting another's viewpoint, are deceptive or illegitimate.  Cross-
species representation, like cross-cultural representation, is not 
automatically colonising or self-imposing, and may express motives and 
meanings of sympathy, support and admiration.  Rather, specific cases 
have to be argued on their merits, not just in terms of the alleged 
intrusion of non-indigenous or human impurities, but in terms of the 
kinds of insights they present or prevent and the moral quality of their 
representation.6  We need to put into place here counter-practices which 
oppose colonising tendencies in these contexts.  For example, 
representation should keep in mind the distinction between claiming to 
be rather than to represent an other's perspective, to see or speak as the 
other rather than to see or speak with the other.7  In the case of 
translation and indeterminacy, counter-practices could require an effort 
to note non-equivalences in forms of life and to treat difficulties about 
translation as sources of uncertainty and tentativeness.  Using the 
problems of such an approach as a model, we might expect an 
appropriate methodology for dealing with cross-species conceptual 
difference and translation indeterminacy to be one which stressed 
corrigibility and open expectations.  Dealing with both human and 
nonhuman cases of translation indeterminacy requires openness to the 
other and careful, sensitive, and self-critical observation which actively 
seeks to uncover perspectival and centric biases8.    
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So I don't think it can be argued that Babe is lacking in proper respect for 
animal difference because it represents animal subjectivity and 
communication in terms of human language, any more than it can be 
argued that cross-cultural translation is inevitably hegemonic. 
Undoubtedly there can be great variations and moral differences here, but 
again, we cannot reject as automatically colonising the mixed or impure 
perspective which places a human subjectivity into an animal situation. 
Indeed, as the Larsen cartoon about why dinosaurs died out 
demonstrates, such 'anthropomorphic' transferences of perspective may 
be not only funny but philosophically revealing, about ourselves as well 
as about the other. They can enable us to enter into, if not the other's 
subjectivity, the other's situation, and that can contribute to our 
understanding and sympathy.  Here, much depends upon the stance the 
work takes towards the anthrocentrism it represents:  rather than being 
the bearer of an insidious and unexamined inferiorisation of the other, 
the imposition of an obviously human framework may be the joke, a joke 
that is partly on us, and which precisely invites reflection about human 
importations. 
 
Cross-species representations then are not necessarily but can be 
unacceptably human-centred.  Our civilisation is haunted by animal 
images, but those images themselves are often made complicit in the 
project of subordinating real animals and eliminating them from our 
lives.  The privileging of the representation of animals over the animals 
represented is a widespread form of human-centredness which is 
symptomatic of the growing success of the project of human self-
enclosure.  This danger is especially acute in cases like Babe where films 
use living animal actors, rather than more indirect forms of 
representation.  The animal justice movement has been right to raise 
questions about the treatment of animals actors in animal films during 
and after film-making, although perhaps less right where it has ignored 
the difference between the willing participation of domestic animal 
actors and the coerced participation of wild animals, and insisted upon 
conditions so stringent that they would prevent any participation of 
domestic animals in filmic events.  
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The project of human self-enclosure and its privileging of animal 
representation over animal lives is routinised in popular representations 
of animality.  Compare the kind of humanisation displayed in Babe with 
the Disney paradigm of humanisation.  Disney cartoons, as John Berger 
has noted, are usually only superficially about animals; Disney characters 
with stereotypical animal bodies often have totally humanised 
personalities, frequently incorporate little or no recognisable reference to 
the characteristics or situations of the animals represented, and are 
permitted no critical reflection on their relationship to the human 
community or membership of the mixed community.  The animal form 
appears in this anthrocentric conception as a nullity which is made to 
bear the burden of meanings which have no connection with the animal's 
own subjectivity or situation.  The Disney paradigm, normalised in 
television cartoons, is one in which animals are, in John Berger's words,  
'totally transformed into human puppets' whose main role is to naturalise 
various hegemonic forms of the human condition by attributing them to 
the animal 'kingdom'.9  
 
The erasure of animals in the Disney animal cartoon is objectionable for 
reasons that directly reflect its anthrocentrism and its contribution to the 
incorporation of the other, in this case expressed in the inability to 
encounter the animal respectfully as an independent other who is more 
than a disguised form of self. These movements to incorporate the other 
also underlie the highly anthrocentric assumption I criticised above,  that 
an 'animal film' can only be taken seriously to the extent that it is actually 
about humans.  In contrast, a less anthrocentric and belittling treatment 
would take animals seriously as agents, communicative subjects, bearers 
of knowledge, and members of the mixed community who are 
themselves able to observe us and perhaps to reflect critically on us and 
their relationships with us.  On these sorts of criteria of anthrocentrism in 
the treatment of the animal other, I think 'our Babe' comes out rather 
well. 'Eatin' pigs! Barbaric!' exclaims the ewe Maa when she learns of 
the Hoggett's intention to eat Babe.  The animal gaze, we are reminded, 
can also capture and evaluate us.  
 
The criminalised, women, animals - all these are bearers of a denied or 
lessened form of subjecthood, which cannot itself command the position 
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of knower but which is the object of an arrogant form of knowledge 
which so stereotypes and denies their difference and their speech that 
they are obliterated as possible subjects of reciprocal exchange or  
dialogical encounter.  As Foucault notes, to be always under such an 
arrogating observation is also the fate of the prisoner, and as feminists 
have pointed out, a feminised subjectivity is one in which the subject 
internalises such a male gaze.  John Berger10 has claimed that this 
arrogating conception of the other has now gone so far for animals that 
the animal proper is now irrecoverable for us as a possible other for 
encounter and communicative exchange.  He writes: 'animals are always 
the observed. The fact that they can observe us has lost all significance. 
They are the objects of our ever-extending knowledge. What we know 
about them is an index of our power, and thus an index of what separates 
us from them. The more we know, the further away they are'.11  This 
diagnosis is acute but perhaps too fatalistic.  There are cultural means to 
problematise and subvert these anthrocentric conceptions of the animal, 
to recover the animal as subject and reciprocal observer rather than as 
background, passively observed object; it is encouraging then that in the 
final shot of Babe, it is the animal who looks back.  
 
5: Meat and the Colonising Contract   
Among the film's other pleasures are the way the lead character Babe, 
from his position as speaking meat, systematically disrupts each of the 
background assumptions of meat I identified in Part 1. In the initial 
scenes of the film, we have (briefly) to confront the first assumption of 
the multiple and emphatic denials of kinship presupposed by the factory 
farm, and the second as we are introduced to the meat as a speaking 
subject. The third assumption, that of a neat, rational and unproblematic 
hierarchy of considerability based on intellectual ranking, is 
systematically disrupted by Babe and several other characters throughout 
the film, and this is one of its best subversive achievements. Thus Babe's 
assertion of intelligence and communicative status disrupts Fly's 
comfortable assurances to her puppies that 'only stupid animals'  are 
eaten.  This disruption poses ethical and political questions,  analogous 
to questions arising in post-colonial theory about the role of colonial 
hierarchies, about the distinction between meat and non-meat animals, 
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and about the nature of the human contract with that special, more 
privileged group of animals who can never be 'meat'.                                                                     
 
'Babe' is the name of an innocent, an original, Christlike pure soul, to 
whom the first news of the dirty secret of meat is eventually revealed in 
the outhouse by the revolutionary duck Ferdie - where the meat comes 
from, where Babe ('babies') himself comes from, in an act of 
disillusionment which neatly parallels that of the human child newly 
discovering reproductive and sexual relationships. ('Not the Boss!' 
breathes the incredulous Babe, in parallel with the child's shocked 'Not 
my parents!')  But it is from the malevolent cat that Babe finally learns 
the full hurt of the dreadful secret the factory farm and the sinister farm 
meathouse hold.  The unspeakable is finally spoken: pigs are meat, pigs 
are subjects, and pigs suffer the reductive violence which denies,  
distances from and hides their subjectivity.  Babe is only called 'pig' 
while he is alive, but  'they use a different word, "pork or bacon", after 
you are dead', explains the satisfied cat, revelling in her privileged, 
protected status.  As Babe's innocence is stripped away bit by bit, we see 
the gradual unveiling of various levels and kinds of animal oppressions 
and colonisations - the baring of the 'world of wounds' we all somehow 
learn to come to terms with as part of our loss of innocence and 'adult' 
accomodation to an oppressive world. 
 
Positioned as counter to these unveilings of oppression are various 
emancipatory comments and viewpoints from the animals who appear as 
sceptical and critical spectators of the human show. Their comments 
deftly expose the politics of the mixed community, especially its human 
violence and surrogate dog violence, and the strangeness of human ways.  
They give us positive perspectives on the importance of listening to and 
being open to others, and on the injustice, distortion and violence of the 
exclusionary boundaries which keep Babe positioned as meat.  We feel 
the thrill of broken chains, the excitement of emancipation as Babe is 
gradually enabled to break the boundaries which keep him positioned as 
meat, finally crossing the privileged threshold of the house from which 
he has been so pointedly excluded to watch television with the farmer 
and Babe's surrogate dog mother Fly.   
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What I found particularly illuminating here was the exposure of the 
levels of hierarchy among animals created by human colonisation in the 
small human empire of the farm, an empire which makes concrete human 
desire and human will in its social relations and its rational design of the 
earth and of the animals themselves. The film displays the key role of 
these boundaries of exclusion and levels of hierarchy among animals in 
maintaining the practices of meat and the non-subject status of the meat 
animal.  The dogs, in the canine equivalent of human chauvinism, 
attribute their privilege with some complacency to their greater 
intelligence, but that facile fabrication is disrupted for us nicely by 
Babe's pig intelligence in some of the film's earliest scenes.  What is 
exposed as unstable, duplicitous and oppressive here is the conventional 
boundary and contract on which the relatively privileged status of the pet 
and 'house' animal is based, which bears on the privileged status of dogs 
and cats in Western society.  
 
Because it reveals the conventionality and instability of the 
considerability hierarchy among animals, the film provides us with the 
materials to reconstruct the Contract or political origin story for the 
privileged group of 'pets' or personal companion animals. In early times, 
hunting, farming and shepherding man ('the Boss') in certain societies 
made a contract with certain wolves: the contract was that they would be 
given a respected role and position very different from that of other 
animals, that they would never be meat, in return for help with a critical 
task.  That task was their active help in the oppression and imprisonment 
of other animals, whom they would, using their more-than-human 
sensory or physical skills, help confine and construct as meat.  In return 
for their help in constructing other animals as meat, not only would they 
themselves never be meat, they would be 'looked after', given a share of 
the meat themselves. Their subjectivity would be recognised, and the 
reductive Cartesian conception would never apply to them.  The working 
animal might often be a 'familiar', like the sheepdogs in Babe, the subject 
of a deeply personal relationship, but also accorded the dignity of a co-
worker and acknowledged for their skilful contribution to economic life. 
In the same sense that various human mythic Contracts or founding 
political stories are about dividing the spoils, this was a Contract not 
only about cooperation in economic life but about mutual benefit in 
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meat.  But as the disruptions of Babe neatly demonstrate, inclusion in the 
contract class has nothing to do with 'intelligence', and everything to do 
with complicity. 
 
This Old Contract, originally a cooperative work contract according 
privilege in return for complicity in the practice of meat and the 
domination or elimination of the non-contract animals, is later under the 
Modern Contract extended to the privileged companion animals - the 
pets - with whom so many of us continue to share our lives, but extended 
in a new form. As production moves out of the household at the 
beginning of the modern era, the role of farm-household animals is 
transformed in the new separation of public/private in much the same 
way as the role of women.  Both the working farm wife and the working 
farm animal now become subject to the modernist polarity that construes 
'rational' economic relationships in alienated, masculinist and narrowly 
instrumental terms as hyperseparated from moral and  affective familiar 
relationships, and affective relationships as occurring in a highly 
circumscribed 'private' sphere of altruism supposedly untainted by 
economic considerations.  The 'familiar' working animal of the contract 
class is replaced by the bourgeois 'pet' who, like the bourgeois wife, 
leads a sheltered life in a protected private household.12 
 
The hyperseparation between the 'pet' animal and the 'meat' animal is 
intensified as the meat animal becomes subject to the rationally 
instrumentalised mass-production regime of the factory farm or 
laboratory.  The 'familiar' animal disappears, and the complementary 
polarity of the subjectivised and underemployed 'pet' animal and the 
reduced and instrumentalised 'meat' animal takes its place. As Babe 
reminds us, the 'familiar' working animal could integrate reason and 
emotion, economic and affective, public and private, elements and 
exemplify animal skill, difference and mystery.13  In the Old Contract 
relationship (at its best), 'familiars' were skilful and respected co-
workers, whose economic role was based on their difference from the 
human and their consequent ability to extend human senses and human 
powers; in the Modern Contract relationship (at its worst), the pet is a 
servile toy or dependent lacking both autonomy and mystery, often 
conceived in humanised terms as a childlike or inferior self, and for such 
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structural reasons increasingly marginal to human lives.14  These are of 
course the extremes of a possible continuum, but one that in practice 
tends to be configured in response to the political forces underlying the 
Old and Modern Contracts.  If the pet and the meat tend now to 
monopolise the roles these forces have left open, what has disappeared is 
the possibility of the animal 'familiars' Babe reimagines for us - the same 
animals integrated into our economic as into our affective lives, and at 
the same time the possibility of a less alienated form of economic life 
which integrates not only the real but the symbolic animal in the form of 
affective creativity. 
 
For urban dwellers, which is, increasingly, most of us, animals of the 
Modern Contract class of pets usually now represent our main contact 
with the animal world.  This is unfortunate, because the Modern Contract 
defines the pet in opposition to the meat animal and reflects and repeats 
many of the duplicities, denials and exclusions  involved in the 
surrounding western institution of meat.  The exclusionary form of the 
original contract of complicity in meat is retained and intensified in the 
Modern Contract with the pet, usually a carnivore whom the owner  
continues to feed on the flesh of other 'meat' animals.  The malevolent cat 
in Babe is seen thus profiting from the death of the Christmas duck 
Rosanna;  in real life, non-privileged animals assigned to the 'meat' side 
of this dualistic hierarchy die to make meat for the pets of people who 
think of themselves unproblematically as animal lovers - kangaroos, 
dolphins, penguins, anonymous and rare marine animals in yearly 
billions are slaughtered at some remove to feed the cats and dogs whose 
own deaths as meat would be unthinkable to their owners.    
 
If the 'pet' is defined in terms of the same Modern Contract that defines 
the 'meat' animal, we can understand as complementary constructions the 
strongly dualistic boundaries of the 'pet' and 'meat' animal; the pet animal 
is a communicative and ethical subject, ideally subject to consideration 
and fit for human companionship, the meat animal is none of these 
things.  If the pet and the meat are complementary polarised aspects of 
the same contract, it is this tainted and hidden relationship that enables 
our simultaneous claim to love some animals and to have a right to 
ruthlessly exploit other animals who are not very different, to 
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simultaneously admit pet subjectivity and ignore or deny meat-animal 
subjectivity.  The Old Contract dignified the role of contract animals, but 
presupposed an instrumental relationship to other animals, and this 
division becomes a pet/meat dualism in the contract of the modern era. 
This genealogy does much to explain the extraordinary contradictions 
involved in our contemporary treatment of animals and our claims to 
love and respect animals.  For example, it is these dualistic contracts that 
'animal lovers' honour when they, perhaps even sometimes as vegetarians 
or vegans themselves, bring into existence and even breed carnivorous 
pet animals whom they feed on the 'meat' of other animals;  or whom pet 
lovers irresponsibly introduce to inappropriate environments where they 
are permitted to make other animals meat and to disrupt carefully 
balanced and negotiated communities of free-living animals.  The 
dualism of the Modern Contract forms the background to such abuses as 
the dumping of domestic cats in the wild by 'animal lovers', to become a 
menace to indigenous animals in contexts like Australia where there are 
few checks and balances.  
 
The moral dualism of both the Old and the Modern Contract helps 
construct the taboo against recognising the subjectivity of the meat 
animal, as well as the general failure to recognise animal subjectivity, 
and produces the moral evasions of meat, especially factory-farmed meat.  
Most modern urban dwellers have had some positive experiences with 
animals such as dogs or cats, have at some time allowed themselves to 
experience them as narrative and communicative subjects rather than as 
Cartesian 'machine-animals' or as mindless bodies.  But the ethical 
dualism and impermeability of this contract boundary prevents them 
transferring this awareness to other animals considered 'meat animals' or 
to wild animals, reflected in the contradiction of the animal lover's horror 
taboo against eating dogs and contrasting indifference or complacency 
about the horrific treatment of the 'meat animal'.  The recognition drama 
of Babe takes us some distance then towards pushing over this key 
barrier to a better consciousness of the moral and ecological status of all 
animals, showing us how Babe is excluded from contract status as meat, 
and how both Babe and the sheep are oppressed by the contract and by 
the privilege of the dogs and cats.  
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But in another crucial way the film fails to resolve some key ambiguities 
surrounding the contract.  For we can also read Babe's liberation in the 
end of the film as his joining or displacing the dogs in the contract, 
recasting him  in the role of non-violent communicator with the rest of 
the farm animals. Is Babe's liberation then to be set within the Old 
Contract's complicity in the oppression of non-contract animals, and the 
Modern Contract's dualism of the meat and the pet?  Is it merely the 
correction of a mistaken individual placement in the hierarchical species 
order of rational meritocracy the contracts preserve? Or does it open up a 
new possibility: that Babe's liberation can somehow be extended to all 
other animals?  To the extent that it is an exclusionary contract, in which 
some make a living by complicity in instrumentalising, imprisoning and 
oppressing others, the contract cannot be extended to provide liberation 
for all.  The attempt to use such a contract as a basis for liberation only 
succeeds in re-erecting the barrier of moral dualism in a new place, 
slightly extending the class of persons while leaving the person/property 
dualism unquestioned.   
 
Here we come up against the limits imposed by the liberal understanding 
of liberation as individual salvation and by its occlusion of its key 
underlying dualistic constructions, which applied to the animal sphere 
generates the same problems that various human liberation movements 
encounter with liberalism.  If Babe is to be saved within the limits of 
privilege the contracts define, or because he is included in the category 
of persons in recognition of his newly-discovered resemblance to the 
human and discontinuity from other animals, we can recognise this as the 
same colonising contract some forms of liberal feminism have endorsed, 
to allow the other to survive at the price of bringing them under the sign 
of the Same and to elevate a few through complicity in the oppression of 
others.  Feminists such as Elizabeth Cady Stanton, for example, argued 
that women should be admitted to the privileged class of political 
rightholders in virtue of their discontinuity with allegedly 'lower groups' 
such as negro slaves, and their similarity to the master group, elite white 
men.  The strategy of extending the category of persons without recasting 
the person/property dualism in which it is constructed is bound to fail as 
an attempt to elevate animals, for exactly the same reasons that similar 
liberal feminist strategies were/are bound to fail. The door opens to admit 
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a few, but closes to keep the rest outside where they were.  One boundary 
of moral dualism is momentarily penetrated, but the rest remain in place 
or new ones are constructed.   So the film apparently displays Babe's 
liberation, but leaves us with the big questions about whether Babe will 
be admitted alone, with all other pigs, with some other pigs, with all 
other animals, or with everything we might consider food?  
 
An anti-anthrocentric culture would, I think, need to reject the colonising 
aspects of the Old Contract Babe shows us, in which 'the Boss' 
undertakes to allow familiars the meat of other animals that are treated as 
beneath moral consideration.  But it would need to reject too the Modern 
Contract in which 'pet' and 'meat' animals are defined in dualistic terms 
as hyper-separated and complementary animal categories, with the hyper-
subjectivised and emotionally-invested 'pet' privileged over the 
undersubjectivised and emotionally-divested 'meat'.  Pet/meat dualism 
resembles male/female dualism in its complex relationships and 
interconnection with other dualisms; thus pet/meat dualism is closely 
associated with and draws on several of the major dualisms that define 
the economic life of liberal modernity, such as public/private, 
reason/emotion, urban/rural and person/property, and there are strong 
resonances with race and gender dualisms for these as well as other 
reasons.15  Pet/meat dualism may be seen as a special case of the larger 
liberal person/property dualism, in which the pet is treated as a de facto 
person, marginally recognised in law, and the meat animal is included in 
the larger category of animal economic property.  
 
Feminists have argued that a proper understanding of liberalism requires 
an understanding of its gendered dimensions in connecting the 
public/private, reason/emotion and male/female dualisms16; it might 
equally be said that understanding liberalism requires an understanding 
of its animal dimensions, in connecting the human/animal, pet/meat 
person/property, public/private, and reason/emotion dualisms.  We have 
already noticed in part 3 that there is a radical kind of inequality and a-
reciprocity in modern commodity practices of meat that is often not 
present in the society of the hunter-gatherer, where carnivorous practices 
could express not so much superiority to animals as human inclusion 
within a common human-animal realm of reciprocal predation and life-
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exchange.  So marked is this that 'meat' can be said to have a different 
meaning in each of these political contexts. An important implication for 
theory of both these sets of observations is that to understand our 
contemporary patterns of relationship with animals we need a more 
clearly socially and especially politically nuanced and situated analysis 
of these categories than is achievable within the confines of an animal 
ethics framework.  That is why I have used the term 'animal justice' 
instead of the terms 'animal rights' or 'animal defence'.  
 
Moving beyond the contracts17 does not imply that we have to forgo all 
systematic association with animals, but rather that we have be prepared 
to consider carefully the politics of human/animal relationships and test 
them against the criterion of realisation in a society where none are 
morally excluded and made available for the horrors of the gulag.  But if 
the concept of the 'pet' is tainted by the same contract and public/private 
duality that defines the 'meat', where do we start?  I think that the attempt 
to negotiate a new communicative model of relationship with animals 
could do worse than start from the concept of the 'familiar' Babe  makes 
visible again, because the 'familiar' relationship escapes some of the 
rigidity of the pet/meat dualism; thus the relationship with the working 
animal was often strongly communicative, built on a respect for animal 
difference, and unified rather than split the rational-economic and 
emotional connection with the animal.  Your new familiar could be an 
animal with whom you form some kind of communicative bond, 
friendship, protective relationship, companion-ship, or acquaintance. The 
familiar may, if you are very lucky, be a wild free-living animal in your 
local surroundings you see sufficiently often to come to know 
individually. Relationships with local lizards, birds, and occasionally 
friendly mammals like wombats, are examples. Or they may be a 
domesticated or semi-domesticated animal with whom you have 
economic as well as affective relations not dependent on the moral 
exclusion of other animals.  These possibilities start to become available 
to us once we begin to see beyond the dualisms that underpin the 
contracts.  
 
An attempt to rework the 'familiar' relationship for a new time must 
clearly reject the familiar's traditionally oppressive roles in relation to 
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other animals.  But many of the domestic animals who suffered under the 
contracts, hens, ducks and geese for example, thrive as human familiars 
and can live with us in ways that enable the formation of communicative 
relationships, mutual enjoyment, and exploration - without requiring a 
further class of excluded animals who exist instrumentally to provide 
them with meat.18  We have to ensure that we take responsibility for any 
harm our familiars may do to ecological communities or to communities 
of free-living animals, whose welfare I believe should, in the event of 
conflict, take priority over our desire for animal companions, and in 
many if not most contexts this must mean abandoning the fostering of 
dogs and cats.  Combining this new/old kind of 'familiar' personal and 
moral relationship with animals with an economic relationship, as Babe  
imagines, is challenging, to say the least, and involves negotiating so 
many difficult tensions that it must ultimately lead towards a major 
revisioning and restructuring of economic life.  But the potential rewards 
are great, and such a strategy also indicates routes towards breaking 
down those key contemporary versions of reason/emotion and 
public/private dualism that help construct the linked forms of alienation 
involved in the human workplace and the animal gulag.  To the extent 
that Babe helps us reimagine the animal as potential familiar rather than 
as pet or as meat,  it offers us a glimpse of an overgrown but still 
discernible path which could begin our journey towards a non-oppressive 
form of the mixed community and a livable future respectfully shared 
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